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1. INTRODUCTION 
Serious difficulties have been encountered in the literature on dynamical 
games, particularly on the differential level, in attempts to develop a satis- 
factory formulation of the game dynamics. These are associated mainly with 
the nature of strategies and their explicit use as input variables in the dynamics 
generating formula, e.g., [I, 5, 13, 181. 
Control systems, which may be regarded as the dynamics of one-person 
games, have been successfully modelled by Roxin ([14, [15]) in terms of 
attainability sets as general control systems. In doing this he achieved 
considerable generality and technical simplicity by not explicitly using the 
control functions as input variables. Moreover, a similar attainability set 
formulation encompasses ordinary differential equations without uniqueness 
[25], contingent equations [16], and even certain stochastic control systems 
[6]. In this paper we will call such systems general semi-dynamical systems 
(GSDS). 
Our purpose here is to use attainability sets to describe the dynamics of 
N-person (N 3 2) games in such a way as to overcome, or at least circumvent, 
the shortcomings of currently used formulations of game dynamics. The 
procedure we follow inverts that usually used in the literature: To each player 
we assign a priori a set of admissible dynamical systems, all of which are 
general semi-dynamical systems on a complete locally compact metric state 
space. Strategies will appear only as indices of these admissible dynamical 
systems, and no assumptions will be made on the analytical nature of these 
strategies nor on the information patterns of the players, though it will be 
assumed, where applicable, that appropriate feedback mechanisms are already 
built into the systems. 
The novelty of this construction lies in the interpretation we give to each 
player’s admissible dynamical systems and is so chosen to avoid the subtle 
pitfalls introduced into the attainability concept by a conflict situation: 
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An admissible dynamical system of a player is that corresponding to his pitting 
one of his admissible strategies against the totality of admissible strategies of the 
other N - 1 players. 
Knowing only his own choice of strategy, such a dynamical system is a 
player’s sharpest estimate of the future evolution of the game. If, however, he 
were to somehow discover the strategy (i.e., admissible dynamical system) 
chosen by some other player, he could considerably improve this estimate by 
taking the intersection of this system with his own. 
In Sections 2 and 3 we state various definitions and the basic properties of 
general semi-dynamical systems. The difficulties encountered in formulating 
game dynamics are then discussed in depth in Sections 4 and 5, motivating the 
above construction. In Sections 6 and 7 we define the motion-intersection of 
general semi-dynamical systems in terms of their common motions (i.e., 
trajectories) rather than attainable points and show that it is also a general 
semi-dynamical system. 
Four axioms are imposed on the players’ sets of admissible dynamical 
systems in Section 8, to ensure the consistency of the above interpretation 
and to allow switching during the evolution of play. Then in Section 9 an 
example is given of a two-person differential game with no information and 
a consistency theorem is proved in Section 10. The advantages of this formula- 
tion of game dynamics is discussed in some detail in Section 11, with particular 
emphasis on its generality and conceptual simplicity. 
The objectives of the players are considered in an abstract fashion in 
Section 12, and in Section 13 we show that our model IS particularly well 
suited to games with qualitative objectives in that it enables each player to 
first analyze the game as a control rather than a conflict situation. In addition 
we give an example of a qualitative analog of the saddle point concept. 
Quantitative objectives are then discussed in Section 14 from the perspective 
of our model, though briefly as much of what is already known in the literature 
on quantitative games is valid here, except extra caution must be exercized 
as we do not require unique outcomes for any given strategy N-tuple. 
To illustrate the potential of our model and the insight it offers into the 
actual conflict, we analyze a two-person quantitative game of fixed duration 
in the remaining sections of the paper. This game has already been considered 
on the contingent equation level by Krasovskii and his coworkers [lO--12,261. 
Our main result is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 
what Krasovskii calls a saddle point for this game. In terms of our model this 
condition is very simple to check, unlike one given by Krasovskii. Actually 
this game is in general nonzero sum, so we conclude with a few remarks on 
the applicability to it of the Nash equilibria and von Stackelberg solution 
concepts (e.g., [21]). 
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2. NOTATION 
Let (X, d) denote a complete locally compact metric space, the points of 
which will represent the states of a given system. The independent variable 
t E R+ will be called time and point sets in X-space will be denoted by capital 
letters A, B,... . 
In order to avoid infinite distances between sets we will replace the given 
metric d(a, b) by 
f(U, b) = 4% W(l + 44 4 (2.1) 
We then define the distance between points and sets, and between sets, by 
p(a, B) = inf{p(u, b); b E B}, (2.2) 
S(A, B) = inf{p(u, b); a E A, b E B}, (2.3) 
p*(A, B) = SUP{&, B); a~4 (2.4) 
~(4 B) = max{p*tA, B), p*tB, 4, (2.5) 
and observe that 
W, B) < p*(A, B) < d4 B) 
for any nonempty subsets A and B of X. 
It is well known that (2.5) defines a pseudometric on the class of all non- 
empty subsets of X and a true metric, called the Huusdorff metric, on the 
class of all nonempty closed subsets of X. 
3. GENERAL SEMI-DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS 
A general semi dynamical system (GSDS) is g iven in terms of an uttuinubility 
set function which has the following intuitive meaning: The evolution of the 
GSDS is determined by its initial state x0 and initial time t, . The set of all 
possible points in X that may be reached by the system at time t, > t, from 
the initial condition (x,, , to) is called its attainability set for (x0 , t, , tl) and is 
denoted by F(q, , t, , tl). Th e o f 11 owing five axioms are assumed satisfied: 
AXIOM 1A. F(x,, , t, , tl) is a closed nonempty subset of X, defined for all 
x,, E X and t, > t, > 0. 
AXIOM 2A (Initial Condition). F(x, , t, , t,) = {x,,} for all x,, E X and 
t, 3 0. 
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AXIOM 3A (Semigroup Property). 
for all x,, E X and t, > t, 3 to 3 0. 
AXIOM 4A. F(xo , to , t) is continuous in t with respect to the Hausdorff 
metric: given x0 E X, t, > to > 0 and E > 0, there is a 6 = 6(~, x0 , to , tI) > 0 
such that 1 t - t, j < 6 implies that 
AXIOM 5A. F(x, , t, , t) is upper semicontinuous in (x0, to , t) with 
respect to the Hausdorf? metric: Given x0 E X, t, > to 3 0 and E > 0, there 
is a 6 = a(~, x0, to , tl) > 0 such that 
~*(F(xo’> to’, tl’>,F(xo , to , td) < E 
for all x0’ E X and t,’ > to’ 3 0 satisfying p(x,‘, x0) < 6, / to’ - to 1 < 6, and 
I t1’ -t,/ <s. 
The term semi in the name of these systems is a consequence of our not 
assuming the backwards extendability axiom common in much of the literature, 
namely, for any x1 E X and t, > to > 0, there exists an x0 E X such that 
x1 EF(x, , to , tl). Moreover, on account of the local compactness of the state 
space and the above axioms, it can be shown that the attainability sets are in 
fact compact, e.g., [7, 151. 
The above attainability set formulation has been used successfully over 
the past twenty-five years to characterize multivalued dynamical systems of 
quite diverse analytical representation, such as ordinary differential equations 
without uniqueness [25], contingent equations [16], ordinary differential 
control equations [15], and certain stochastic systems [6]. Discrete-time 
GSDS have also been considered, e.g., [4]. (They are somewhat simpler to 
handle than their continuous-time counterparts and thus will be used in this 
paper as a source of counter examples.) 
Trajectories of a GSDS can be defined in terms of its attainability set 
function. Actually we will reserve the name trajectory for the images of the 
following singlevalued functions of time which we call motions. 
DEFINITION 3.1. A motion of a GSDS is a singlevalued function 
$: [to, tl] -+ Xsatisfying+(t,) EF($(t,), t, , ta) for any t, > t > t > t > 0. I b.‘aI 01 
Continuity of motions, not assumed in their definition, can be established 
from Axioms lA-5A, as can their existence, i.e., if x1 EF(x,, , to, tJ, there 
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exists a motion $: [t, , tr] + X with +(ta) = x,, and $(tl) = x1 . It then follows 
from this and Axioms 1A and 3A that any motion can be prolonged for all 
future time t > t, . We will assume that this has been done and will denote 
by @(x0 3 t,; F) the set of all motions of the GSDSF with $(ts) = x0 . See [7]. 
The following result will be required several times in the sequel. It was first 
proved in a less general form by Barbashin and in its present form by the 
author [8]. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let x, -+ x0 in X and t, + t, in [0, T] us n + 00 where 
t, < T < CO. Furthermore, let (4%) be a sequence of motions of a GSDS F with 
$a E @(xn , t,; F) for-n = 1,2,3 ,... . Then there exists a convergent subsequence 
{&} and a motion $ E @(x0 , t,; F) such that $nj(~,,) -+&so) j + co .for any 
convergent sequence s, -+ s,, with t, < s, < T, n = 1, 2, 3 ,... . 
We will require a topology on the space g(X) of all GSDS on the state 
space X. For this we define the following modification of the concept of 
continuous convergence. It is, however, stronger because it guarantees 
rather than assumes in advance that the limits are unique GSDS in g(X). In 
terms of our game model, this will ensure that the limit of a convergent net 
of admissible GSDS is also an admissible GSDS. We observe that the domain 
of definition of the GSDS in s(X) is the metric space 
y = u Go Y t, , t,); x,x, t, >, 43 20). 
DEFINITION 3.2. Let {FV} be a net of GSDS in s(X) and let F be a closed- 
set valued mapping from Y + X. Then we say that F, converges to F, written 
F, --f F, if the following four convergences 
p*(Fv(x, , t, 7 4, F(xo 7to ,so>> -+ 0, (3-l) 
p(Fv(xo , to > 4, F(xo , to , so)) - 0, (3.2) 
p(Fv(xo , to , 4, W’(xo , to , TA 71>4) --+ 0, (3.3) 
p(Fv(x, 6 4, F(x, t, 4) -+ 0 uniformly in (x, t, s) E A, (3.4) 
hold simultaneously for all convergent nets (x~ , t, , s,) -+ (x0 , to , so) in Y, all 
nonempty compact subsets A of Y, and all instants of time ~~ > rr > to > 0. 
The following result is then true [9]. 
THEOREM 3.2. The convergence of definition 3.2 induces a HausdorJlyr 
topology on g(X), such that s(X) is a closed subspace qf any larger class of 
mappings with this topology. 
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4. DIFFICULTIES IN THE FORMULATION OF GAME DYNAMICS 
A dynamical game can be defined in terms of its rules, dynamics and the 
objectives of its players. Quite serious difficulties, however, arise in trying to 
develop a satisfactory formulation for the game dynamics. The usual procedure 
followed in the literature (e.g., [3, 18,231) is to specify apriori classes of admis- 
sible strategies for the players and a mapping which yields the appropriate 
dynamics on insertion of a strategy by each of the players, e.g., in differential 
games this mapping in an ordinary differential equation. The difficulties 
encountered are most commonly associated with the analytic representation 
of this dynamics-generating mapping and include the existence and uniqueness 
of solution dynamics, the determination of maximal classes of admissible 
strategies for a given information pattern, and the topological properties of 
these classes of admissible strategies and the corresponding solution dynamics. 
There have been several rather ingenious attempts on the differential level 
to overcome, or at least circumvent, these difficulties, and in spite of their 
peculiar shortcomings quite far reaching results have been obtained, e.g., 
[l, 5, IO]. The techniques used, however, are on the whole valid only for 
games with perfect information and require considerable effort to be expended 
on questions pertaining to the particular analytic representation used. While 
this may in practice be essential for the actual solution to a game, we believe 
it tends to obscure and detract from the fundamental purpose of a mathe- 
matical theory of dynamical games, namely to investigate the logical structure 
of a conflict situation. 
That a differential structure is by no means essential in modeling dynamical 
systems has been successfully exploited in both dynamical systems and control 
theories. There are, however, only a few references in the literature on non- 
differential descriptions of game dynamics and these are either usually 
restricted to putsuit-evasion games or merely precede an investigation on the 
differential level (e.g., [3, 13, 18, 22, 23, 271). The most promising of these 
seems to be the model for two-person games with perfect information advanced 
by Stonier [23] and Skowronski [22], in which the game dynamics are defined 
axiomatically in terms of a dynamical polysystem 
F:G,xG,xXxR+xR++X, 
where X is a complete locally compact metric state space and Gi = {sI(x, t)}, 
the maximal class of admissible strategies of the ith player (i = 1, 2). 
Moreover, it is assumed for each strategy pair (sr , ss) E 6, x 6, that the 
mappings F(s, , sa ,... ), F(s, , 6, ,... ), and F(G,, , sa ,...) are all general semi- 
dynamical systems. 
This model is of considerable generality due to the diversity of systems 
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describable as general semi-dynamical systems and, heuristically, subsumes 
differential treatments of game dynamics, in particular the contingent 
equation work of the Krasovskii group (e.g., [lO-12, 261). The question of 
existence is avoided here by assumption and the possible nonuniqueness of 
outcomes for a strategy pair (si , SJ is handled in a most natural way. There 
are, however, severe restrictions due to the explicit use of strategies as input 
variables in the mappingF. These are mainly the need to topologize the classes 
Gi (i = 1, 2) of admissible strategies and to impose some kind of continuity 
condition on F with respect to these strategies. An example of this is Stonier’s 
use of continuous nonempty compact setvalued mappings as admissible 
strategies and his assumption that F is upper semicontinuous in them. 
Control systems may be regarded as the dynamics of one-person games. 
When Roxin [14] developed his general (semi) dynamical systems formulation 
of them, he achieved considerable generality and technical simplicity by not 
explicitly using the control functions as input variables. Moreover, both 
Petrosyan [13] and Varaiya [27] h ave in effect modeled the dynamics of 
pursuit-evasion games with two such uncoupled control systems and achieved 
much the same benefits. We believe they are also to be had for dynamical 
games in general provided the strategies are assumed already built into the 
game dynamics and are used only to index the corresponding dynamics. 
5. ATTAINABILITY SETS IN DYNAMICAL GAMES 
Subtle nuances are introduced into the attainability concept on passing 
from control systems to dynamical games with more than one player, due to 
the conflicting aims of the players or deficiencies in communication between 
them. 
In a control system there exists by definition for any attainable point 
x1 E F(xo , t, , tr) an admissible control which the controller can implement to 
ensure that x1 is reached at time t, . In a dynamical game, however, no one 
player generally has complete control over the game dynamics. In particular, 
in a two-person game to fix ideas, if Player 1 selects an admissible strategy 
SlE&, then, in the absence of knowledge of the other player’s choice of 
strategy, he can predict the future evolution of play starting at (x0, to) only 
to within the attainability set F(s, , 6, , x,, , t, , t) in the terminology of the 
Stonier-Skowronski model. Which point or points are actually reached in this 
set depends very much on the other player’s choice of strategy. Roxin [20] has 
quite lucidly illustrated the pitfalls that may arise in assuming any more than 
this. 
Nevertheless we can use this apparent restriction in a most natural way to 
axiomatically construct a model of game dynamics without having to explicitly 
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use the strategies as input variables. To do this we assign to each player, 
i (i = 1, 2), a set Bi of admissible general semi-dynamical systems in g(X). 
We interpret each dynamic system in IDi as the dynamics resulting from his 
“playing” one of his admissible strategies against the totality of admissible 
strategies of the other player. The set & of indices of the GSDS in 3, will 
be regarded as the set of admissible strategies of the ith player (i = 1, 2). 
Thus, for example, a GSDSFsl in Q corresponds to the GSDSF(s, , 6, ,...) 
in the Stonier-Skowronski model. 
An interesting aspect of this formulation is that, in games in which the 
players have qualitative objectives, it enables each player to first analyze the 
game as a control problem. For this he searches his set IDi for an admissible 
GSDS which fulfils his desired goal; if successful he can then play the game 
without having to take into account the possible behavior of the other player. 
To proceed further with the construction of our game model we need 
somehow to be able to reclaim from the respective choices F,% E 3), and 
FSz E IDa of admissible GSDS the dynamics corresponding to the strategy pair 
(sr , ss). In the context of the Stonier-Skowronski model this means the GSDS 
F(sl , s2 ,...). F or t h is we need to define an intersection of the two GSDS FS, 
and FS, in such a way as to yield a third GSDS FS1,, representing the dynamics 
corresponding to the player’s using strategies si and sa , respectively. 
6. THE INTERSECTION OF GSDS 
Superficially the most obvious way of defining the intersection F,, of two 
G,SDS Fl and F, on the same state space X is as the intersection of their 
attainability sets, 
F&G, , 4, , t) = Fl(xo , t, , 4 n&(x, , t, , t>, 
which we assume nonempty for all x0 E X and t > t, . 
(0) General Dynomicol System F1 
3 :: 
t-0 ,-I t-2 t-3 1=4 
(b) Geneml Dynamical System Fa 
:; 
tro t-1 1-a ,=a t-4 
FIGURE 1 
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This is, however, quite unsatisfactory because F,,(xs , t, , t) thus defined 
need not satisfy the semigroup property (Axiom 3A) of a GSDS as we show 
in the following example. 
EXAMPLE 6.1. Consider the two discrete-time GSDS Fr and F, on the 
discrete state space X = { 1,2} which are defined graphically in Figs. l(a) and 
l(b), respectively. Then with F,, defined as above we have 
and 
F,,U, 29.i) = (1) for j = 2, 3, 4 ,..., 
%(l, O,i) = 111 for j = 0, 1 and 2, 
=x for j = 3, 4, 5 ,..., 
which means that 
Fl,(&,(l,O, 9, Zj) = F& ZA 
$ F& W for j = 3, 4, 5 ,... . 
This situation is intuitively quite absurd if we are to interpret F,, as a 
dynamical system because it implies that this system has “attainable” points 
which cannot be reached by a trajectory of the system. We can avoid it if 
instead we define the intersection of GSDS in terms of the motions 
(trajectories) that they have in common rather than attainable points. To 
distinguish this from the above intersection of attainability sets we call it their 
motion-intersection. 
DEFINITION 6.1. Let Fl and F, be two GSDS on a state space X such that 
for each x0 E X and to > 0 
bwo,to) f 0. (6.1) 
i=l 
Then their motion-intersection F12 is defined for each x,, E X and t, 3 to > 0 
as 
Flz(xo , to ,tl) = u Ix1 E x; 3+ E h @‘(x0 , to; Fs) with 4(tl) = xl/. 
i-l 
In order to show that this motion-intersection, where defined, is also a 
GSDS, we will require the following lemma, which is an immediate conse- 
quence of Theorem 3.1. 
206 PETER E. KLOEDEN 
LEMMA 6.1. Let Fl and F, be two GSDS as in Definition 6.1 and let 
x,-+x,,inXandt,-+t,in[O, T]asn-+ oowheret, < T < co.Furthermore, 
let {b) be a sequence of motions with $n E nt=, @(xn , t,; FJfor n = 1, 2, 3,... . 
Then there exists a convergent subsequence {Bj} and a motion+ E &, @(x,, to; Fi) 
such that &,(s~,> -+ &so) as j + co for any convergent sequence s, -+ s,, with 
t, < s, < T, n = 1, 2, 3 ,... . 
THEOREM 6.1. The motion-intersection of two GSDS, where dejned, is 
also a GSDS. 
Proof. Let Fl and F, be two GSDS as in Definition 6.1. We will show 
with the following five propositions that their motion-intersection F12 IS also 
a GSDS. 
PROPOSITION 6.1. F&x, , t, , tl) is a nonempty compact subset of X for each 
x0 E X and t, > t, 3 0. 
Proof. Nonemptiness follows from (6.1) and the prolongability for all 
future time of the motions of a GSDS. Now let x, eFlz(x,, , t, , tl) for 
n = 1) 2, 3 )... . Then there exist motions & E & @(x0 , to; Fi) with 
&(tl) = x, for 71 = 1, 2, 3,... and by Lemma 6.1 there is a convergent 
subsequence & -+$ E &r @(x0, to; FJ as j -+ co. Hence, there is a 
convergent subsequence x,, = +nj(tl) + x = &tl) E F&x,, , to , tl), from 
which we have the compactness of Flz(xO , t, , tl). 1 
PROPOSITION 6.2. F(x, , t,, , t,) = {x0} for each x0 E X and t, > 0. 
Proof. By definition #to) = x0 for each 4 E &, @(x0, to; Fi). 1 
PROPOSITION 6.3. For any x0 E X and t, > t, > t, > 0, 
F&o , to > tz> =F,,(F (x t t ) t t ). 12 09 07 17 19 2 
Proof. We prove this in two parts, which can be combined to give the 
desired result. 
(A) Let x2 E F12(F12(xo, to, tl), t, , t2). Then there exists an x1* E F12(xo, to, tl) 
such that x2 EF~~(x~*, t , t2), and consequently, there exist motions 
such that x1* = +r(tr) and x2 = #2(t2). 
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Now define 
B(t) = 54(t) for to < t < t, , 
= $2(t) for t, < t. 
Then by Axiom 3A, $ E @5(x0 , to; FJ for i = 1 and 2, and is thus contained in 
the intersection of these two sets. By Definition 6.1, we thus have xs = 
$2@2) E 42(x0 , to , t2), and as it was otherwise arbitrarily chosen 
K2P (x 12 t t ) t t ) C42(xo 7 to > f2)- 03 09 19 1, 2 
(B) For any x2 ~~~~~~~ , o , 2 , t t ) there exists a motion $ E ni=, @(x0 , to; FJ 
with x2 = +(t2). By Axiom 3A 4 E @(4(t), t;FJ for each t > to and i = 1 
and 2. Thus, I$ E & @(x1 , tl;Fi) where x1 = +(tl) ~Fr~(x~ , to , tl), and so 
x2 = (b(t2) ~Fr~(xr , tI , t2) C F,,(F, (x t t ) t t ). 2 0, 27 1, 1, 2 As x2 was otherwise 
arbitrary, we have 
42(xo~~o~t,)C~l2(~ (x t t>t t). I 12 0, 0, 1, 13 2
PROPOSITION 6.4. F,,(xo , to , so) is upper semicontinuous in (x0 , to , so) with 
respect to the Hausdorff metric. 
Proof. Let (xn , t, , s,) -+ (x0 , to , so) in Y as n -+ 0~) and suppose that 
;i-P*(&2(x, > 2% 9 4>~12(XO 7 to YSO)) f 0. 
Then there can be found a subsequence {xn, , tnj , s,$} and a real number 
01 > 0 such that for j = 1, 2, 3 ,..., 
P*(42(%5 9 taj , S?zj)Jl2(XO 7 to > so)) 2 '3 > 0 F-2) 
Now by compactness there exist yn, EF~~(x,~ , t,, , s,,) for j = 1, 2, 3 ,... 
such that 
= P(Y?zj ,&2(x0 > to 3 so>> G P(Yn, ,Y> (6.3) 
for any y E42(xo , o , o t s ). Then by Definition 6.1 there exist motions 
$nj E & @(x0 , to;Fe) with &(sn,) = ypa, for j = 1, 2, 3 ,..., and hence, by 
Lemma 6.1 there is a convergent subsequence‘&jk -+ I$ E ($=, @(x0 , to; FJ in 
such a way that &Js,~,) -+&so) as K -+ 03. 
Consequently by (6.2) and (6.3) we have for k sufficiently large 
P(b,k(snjk)4so)) 2 f*(~l2(xnj, 3 tnj* 3 %J'~12(XO 3 to 9 so)) 
aol>o, 
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which is absurd. From this contradiction we have the validity of the 
proposition. I 
PROPOSITION 6.5. F,,(xo, o, t t) is continuous in t with respect to the 
Hausdorff metric. 
Proof. In view of Proposition 6.4 it remains only to prove for any to < 
S, -+ s0 that 
If this were not so there would exist a subsequence (sn,} and a real number 
(Y > 0 such that forj = 1,2, 3,... 
f*(Flz(~o , to ,So),F&o , to * hj)) 2 01 > 0. 
By compactness there exist z,~ EF~~(x~ , to , s,,) such that 
(6.4) 
f*(F (x 12 o , to, so),F12(~07 to , sy)) = f(Znj ,Fc&~ , to, snj)) for i = L2, 3,... 
and then by Definition 6.1, there exist motions &, E & @‘(x0 , to ; Fi) with 
$,,(s~) = x,~ for j = 1, 2, 3 ,... . Thus, 
P *(FIB(xO , tO ) ‘O)P F12(x0 ) tO 3 ‘?lj)) 
= P(4Sj(sO)y FIS(xO ) tO ) %j>) d f(+?%jtsOh +tSnj))* (6.5) 
From Lemma 6.1 there is a convergent subsequence 
+nj, - B E bl @(x0 9 to; Fi) 
such that &&sn,$ -+ &so) as k -+ 00. Consequently 
f(9?8jk,(sO), 471jk(S71j,)) d f(#?ljfiO)p &‘O)) + f(&sO)9 +njk(snj,)) + O as k +co9 
which contradicts (6.4) and (6.5). This proves the proposition. 1 
We have thus completed the proof to Theorem 6.1 and have as a corollary: 
COROLLARY 6.1. For any x0 E X and t, > to > 0 
(i) @(x0 , to; F,,) = nfxl @(x0 , to; Fi) 
(ii> F&, , to , tJ C n~=lF&o , to, tJ where this inclusion may be 
strict. 
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Our reason for not assuming the backwards extendability axiom in this 
paper is that it need not be preserved in the motion-intersection, even though 
the original two systems satisfy it. 
EXAMPLE 6.2. Consider the two discrete-time GSDS Fl and F, on the 
discrete state space X = (1, 2, 3}, w ic are defined graphically in Figs. 2(a) h h 
and 2(b) respectively. They both satisfy the backwards extendability axiom. 
Their motion-intersection F,, is shown graphically in Fig. 2(c). It satisfies 
Axioms l A-5A of a GSDS, but the backwards extendability axiom is violated 
at (x1 , h) = C&2). 
[a] General Dynamical System F, 
[b] General Dynamical System Fa 
X E :: 
[c] Motion-Intersection F,, 
:‘: :: x - 
x-1 . : ; : = : = : 2 l 
9-o t-1 1-a 1.1 t-4 
FIGURE 2 
7. A CONVENIENT NOTATION 
We have so far considered the motion-intersection of only two GSDS. In 
order to extend it to more than two, we introduce a convenient notation 
describing it as a binary operation on g(X). 
DEFINITION 7.1. Let Fl and F2 be two GSDS as in Definition 6.1, and let 
F,, be their motion-intersection. 
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Then the binary operation A of motion-intersection on g(X) is defined for 
FI and F, as 
F,, =F, AF, =F, hFI, 
i.e., where defined A is commutative. 
PROPOSITION 7.1. Let FI , F, and F3 be three GSDS in g(X). Then a 
necessary and suficient condition for the existence of (FI A F,) A F3 and 
FI A (F, A FJ is that & @(x0, t,; Fi) # .B. Furthermore, we then have 
(FI A F,) A F3 EE FI A (F, A F3), and thus write it as FI A F, A F3 or /\fzl Fi , 
i.e., A is associative where defined. 
Proof. This follows immediately from the various definitions involved. 1 
Thus, for N > 2, GSDS FI , F2 ,..., FN in g(X) with fly-, 0(x,, , t,; Fi) + 0 
for all x,, E X and t, 3 0, we can define their motion-intersection as 
F 12...N=FI hF2 A -me hFN= i;Fi. 
i=l 
Clearly it is also a GSDS in g(X), and for all x,, E X and t, > 0 
@(xc, , to; %...N) = ; @(xc, , to; Fi). 
i=l 
8. AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF GAME DYNAMICS 
We will now axiomatically develop an attainability set model of game 
dynamics as outlined in Section 5, though here we will consider N >, 2 
players. In what follows we invert the standard practice of specifying classes of 
admissible strategies and a dynamics-generating mapping, by considering 
the admissible dynamics themselves to be the fundamental entities of a 
dynamical game. We will introduce strategies only as indices of these 
admissible dynamics, which will be described entirely by means of general 
semi-dynamical systems. It should be recalled that g(X) denotes the HausdorfI 
topological space of all general semi-dynamical systems on a complete locally 
compact metric state space X. 
Each player i (i = 1,2,..., N) is assigned a priori a set IDi C g(X) of 
admissible dynamical systems atisfying 
AXIOM I. The set 3, of admissible dynamical systems of the ith player 
(i = 1, 2,..., N) is a nonempty compact subset of g(X). 
These sets IDi will each be indexed by a set Gi of what we call admissible 
strategies of the ith player and for any So E Gi , we denote the corresponding 
ATTAINABILITY SET MODEL 211 
GSDS by Fs, (i = 1, 2,..., N). We assume as part of the rules of the game that 
each player knows all of the sets Q (i = 1,2,..., N) of admissible dynamical 
systems, that is, not only his own but also those of the other N - 1 players. 
However, we make no explicit assumptions whatsoever about the nature of 
the information of state available to the players, although we assume wherever 
applicable that the appropriate feedback mechanism is already built into the 
admissible dynamical systems. 
The crux of the model lies in the interpretation that we give to the admissible 
dynamical systems of the players: 
An admissible dynamical system Fsi E IDi corresponds to the dynamics resulting 
when the ith player uses his admissible strategy si E Gi against the totality qf all 
possible admissible strategies of the other N - 1 players (i = 1,2,..., N). 
For example, in the context of the Stonier-Skowronski model where N = 2, 
for some admissible strategy sr E 6, , the admissible dynamical system Fsi~ 3, 
corresponds to the GSDS F(s, , 6, ,...). T o ensure the consistency of this 
interpretation we must include the following axiom in our model: 
AXIOMIT. Forallx,~X,t0>Oandi,j=1,2,...,Nwithi#j, 
We denote the union of motions in Axiom II by @(x0 , to) and observe that 
it corresponds to the totality of all motions of the game emanating from 
(x0 ? t,) for all possible strategy iV-tuples (s, , s2 ,..., s,,,) E 6r x 6, x ... x G,,, 
of the N players. 
We justify our assigning a player’s admissible dynamics in terms of the 
sets Bi C &x?) as interpreted above by the fact that if he does not know which 
strategies the other N - 1 players have chosen, then Player i can predict the 
future course of play starting at (x O , t,,) only to within the set F,,(xO , t, , t) 
for each future instant of time t 3 t, and his own choice of strategy si E Gi . 
If, however, he discovers by some means (e.g., spying on antagonists or 
communicating with coalition partners) the strategy choice of some other 
player, he should be able to considerably sharpen his estimate of the future 
evolution of the partie. This can be done quite simply and naturally by taking 
the motion-intersection of his chosen admissible GSDSF,, with the admissible 
GSDS F,, that he has discovered player .i ( # i) to have chosen. To allow for 
such mot;on-intersections we need the fol!owmg axiom m our model: 
AXIOM III. For any admissible GSDS F,Ti ED~ (i = 1, 2,..., N) and 
x0 E x, t, 3 0, 
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Now let (il i , a ,..., i,v)beanypermutatronof(1,2 ,..., N)andletj=2,3 ,..., N. 
Then by Axiom III for any F,, 
L 
E IDik (k = 1, 2,...,j), the motton-intersection 
J 
is defined and is a GSDS on X. Forj = 1,2,,..., N - 1 it corresponds to the 
dynamics resulting when the j players (il , ia ,..., ii) play the strategy j-tuple 
(Si, 9 S$ ,.‘.I St,) E Gil x G$ x **. X E+ , not necessarily cooperatively, against 
the totality of all possible admissible strategies of the remaining N - j players 
(ij+l , ii+z ,..., iN). When j = N such an FSilS,IS.,.(N corresponds to the 
dynamics resulting from the i&h player using strategy si, E G?iK for 
h = 1, 2 ,..., N. 
Since the operation A of motion-intersection is both associative and 
commutative, where defined, theseF Silsla”‘8tj are independent of the particular 
ordering (i1 , ia ,..., ij). This suggests we could perhaps use a canonical 
ordering such as i1 < i2 < ... < ii. Then for each j = 2, 3 ,..., N and such 
an ordering, by taking all of the appropriate motion-intersections, we can 
construct the sets 
~iliz-ij = {Fs~lSjz...S~j; sikE Gix. for K = 1, 2 ,..., j} 
of admissible dynamical systems of the syndicate (not necessarily cooperative) 
or coaZition (if cooperative) of players (il , iz ,..., iJ. (When j # N here we 
make no assumptions as to whether or not the remaining N -j players form 
a counter-coalition.) 
The very name admissible dynumical systems of the ith player for the set 
ai C g(X) suggests that if he so desires, Player i can implement any GSDS 
in IDi in any partie (i = 1, 2,..., N). To enable him to switch to a new 
admissible dynamical system during its progress and in such a way that the 
composite dynamical system is also admissible, we include the following 
switching axiom in our model: 
AXIOM IV. For any F,; , FS; E Di (i = 1,2 ,..,, N) andxa E X, tl > to >, 0, 
there exists an Fsi E a, such that 
F&o , to , t) = F&o , to , t) for to < t < t, , 
= F,;(qs 4x0, to, t1), t, , 4 for t, < t. 
In terms of admissible strategies Axiom IV means that the piecewise 
composition of admissible strategies is also an admissible strategy. 
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9. AN EXAMPLE 
We now give a simple example to illustrate our attainability set model of 
game dynamics. It is based on a two-person differential game with no informa- 
tion (e.g., see [28]), f or which we will explicitly derive the sets of admissible 
general semi-dynamical systems for each player. It can be easily seen by 
inspection that they satisfy the four axioms of the model. As for the time being 
we are only interested in the game dynamics, we will not specify objectives for 
the players here. We will, however, do that later on in the paper. 
EXAMPLE 9.1. We consider on the state space X = R a two-person 
differential game with no information (other than initial conditions) governed 
by the ordinary differential equation 
3=(--u$v)x (9.1) 
whereO<u<landO<v<l. 
As the players have no information of state other than the initial condition, 
their admissible strategies are respectively the Lebesgue-measurable open- 
loop control functions u: R+ --f [0, l] a.e. and v: R+ -+ [0, I] a.e. We will 
denote these sets of admissible strategies by U and 58, respectively. Then the 
sets 3, and a, of admissible general semi-dynamical systems are constructed 
as follows: 
For any u E U, F,, E 9, is the GSDS satisfying the contingent equation 
i(t) E [-u(t), 1 - u(t)] x(t) 
and can be written for any x,, 2 0 and t > to 3 0 as 
&(x0 , to , t> = [ x0 exp 
Similarly, for any v E b, F, E IDa is the GSDS satisfying the contingent 
equation 
-qt> E [v(t) - 1, v(t)] x(t), 
and for any x0 >, 0 and t > to > 0 can be written as 
F,,(xo , to , t) = [ x0 exp 
In both cases when x0 < 0 the attainability sets are the same as above, 
but with the endpoints interchanged. Also it is easy to see that the two sets 
ID, and ID, of admissible general semi-dynamical systems satisfy Axioms I-IV 
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of the game model. Moreover, we observe that the motion-intersections 
F,, E IDis for any u E U and ZJ E B each have a unique motion for any initial 
condition (x,, , to). In fact, 
F,,(x, , to , 0 = x0 exp 1 (( (-44 + a) ds) 1) 
which is of course the unique solution through (x0, to) of (9.1). This unique- 
ness is, however, peculiar to this particular example and is not demanded by 
Axioms I-IV. 
10. A CONSISTENCY THEOREM 
Axioms II and III were included in our model for the consistency of our 
interpretation of the admissible general semi-dynamical systems. The former 
could have been expressed, possibly more naturally, in terms of attainability 
sets: 
AXIOM II*. Forallx,~X,t,>t,>Oandi,j=1,2,...,Nwithi~j 
u F&o 7 to , t,); si E Gil = u V&o , to , t,); sj E W 
In view of our definition of motion-intersection, Axiom III seems best left 
in its present form. From these two axioms we now show the intuitive 
consistency of the way in which we reclaim the admissible dynamical systems 
for syndicates of players. 
THEOREM 10.1. Let 12 = 2, 3 ,..., N. Then for any x0 E X, to > 0 and 
Fsi, E Qj (j = 1, Z..., k - 11, 
9 
@(x0 , to;FsilsiZ...sik--l) = u P(xo 9 to;F,ilSin...Sik-lSih); sig E 6,). 
Proof. All of these motion-intersections are defined by Axiom III and our 
remarks in Sections 6 and 7. Then for any six: E Giik 
@(x0 , to;F.vilsiZ...aiB) = f) @(xo > to; FsJ 
j=l 
k-l 
c n @(x0 7 to; FsJ 
j=l 
= @(x0 9 to; FSilSil...SikJ 
ATTAINABILITY SET MODEL 215 
and thus, 
u (@(x0 , to; FS’1S’2...Sfk~lSjk)~ si, E CJ c @(x0 Pto; FSilSjg...Sik-l). 
Now take any 45 E @5(x0 , to;F,,18j,...Sit-l). Then by Axiom II, 
k-l 
= @(x0 > to; Fas1sj2...sjkvf;r) 
C U P(xo > to;F,jlsr,...sj~lSr,); sik E G,>, 
and as C$ was otherwise arbitrary we have 
@(x0 9 t09’s,~s,~...s,-) C u P(xo 3 to;F,,l,,,-..sjnclsjk); sib E Q- 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 1 
From this result and Definition 6.1 of motion-intersection, we thus have 
COROLLARY lo.1 Let k = 2,3,..., N. Then for any x0 E X, tl Z to > 0 and 
Fsi,~jDi, (j = 1, 2 ,..., K - l), 
> 
FsjIsj2...s&o > to 3 G) = 0 VC,lsiz...sjk~~sj,(xo 9to 3 0 sil, 6 6,). 
11. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL 
The axiomatic model of game dynamics presented above fully exploits the 
benefits of an abstract theory of dynamical systems and overcomes, or at least 
circumvents, many of the obstacles and shortcomings associated with con- 
temporary formulations of game dynamics. (The reader is also referred to 
the appendix at the end of the paper.) Since the conceptual simplicity and 
generality of general semi-dynamical systems and, in particular, the unifying 
approach they offer for a diversity of systems and state spaces are well known, 
we will restrict our comments here to the game-theoretic aspects of our 
model. 
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Our attainability set formulation of game dynamics has utilized in a most 
natural and unconfusing way the concept of attainability in conflict situations. 
In addition it enables players with qualitative objectives to first investigate 
the game as a control problem. The assumptions made are of considerable 
generality and do not restrict the model to any particular number of players 
or class of dynamical games, as do for instance the pursuit-evasion models of 
Petrosyan [13] and Varaiya [27]. (These can be considered in the context 
of our model by taking as X the Cartesian product of the pursuer and evader 
state spaces.) Moreover, the model can be easily modified by use of Roxin’s 
local general semi-dynamical systems [17] to include dynamical games on a 
restricted state space 2, where 2 is a closed subspace of X. 
The most significant characteristic of our model is the total absence of 
a priori assumptions on the nature of the information patterns, with respect to 
the state-space X, of the players. This is illustrated in its subsuming both 
games with no information (Example 9.1) and games with perfect information 
(e.g., the Stonier-Skowronski model). This is a direct consequence of our 
having specified the admissible dynamics of the players of the players first 
and then introduced their admissible strategies only as indices of these 
admissible dynamical systems. In this way we have avoid all questions on the 
analytical nature of strategies and their associated difficulties. Without such 
primarily peripheral distractions we expect our model to offer far more 
penetrating insight into the logical structure of a game conflict. We will to 
some extent justify this remark with our detailed analysis of a two-person 
nonzero sum quantitative game in the last few sections of this paper. 
It is usual in differential games to demand uniqueness of solutions for any 
given strategy N-tuple (sr , ss ,..., sN) E 6, x Gs x .*. x GN and any given 
initial condition. We, however, impose no such restriction on the general 
semi-dynamical systems Fs18z...sN in D,,..., , although we do not exclude it 
from happening (Example 9.1). There seem to be two possible interpretations 
for nonunique outcomes for a given strategy N-tuple, and both may hold 
simultaneously. Firstly, the strategies may be too crude to guarantee 
uniqueness, as can be seen in the setvalued feedback strategies used by both 
Krasovskii [lo] and Stonier [23]. Another example is the bifurcation on 
discontinuity manifolds in Berkovitz [l]. A second explanation for non- 
uniqueness is that it is an inherent feature of the system, resulting, for example, 
from the presence of bounded uncontrolled disturbances, e.g., [2]. (These 
unbounded disturbances could be attributed to a player called Nature whose 
set IDi contains only one admissible dynamical system.) 
The switching Axiom IV is probably the great cause of difficulty in 
approaching our model from the differential level. For example, in differential 
games with perfect information, switching introduces discontinuities into the 
admissible feedback strategies and thus may violate existence criteria for 
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differential equations. It is, in fact, for this reason that switching is not 
allowed in Krasovskii’s contingent equation games. This is, however, more a 
deficiency in the nature of the differential equations used to describe the game 
dynamics than a consequence of the game conflict itself. It does not arise in 
our model because we assume the existence of the game dynamics in advance. 
It should also be remembered that many differential models are themselves 
just convenient approximations of reality, so there seems little point in 
restricting one’s attention to them alone or in considering their limitations as 
being absolute. 
12. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAYERS 
The ith player has as his objective in the game some property Pi which 
he wishes to secure when play commences somewhere within a certain set 
sZi C X x R+ of initial events of interest to him (i = 1, 2,..., IV). He is, of 
course, assumed to know what his own objective is, but he need not be fully 
aware of those of the other players, e.g., see [21]. Conflict may then occur, 
depending on the interrelation of the N ordered pairs (Q, , Pi). It may vary 
from none at all (i.e., coorperative games) to total antagonism (zero sum 
games). A classification of some of the possibilities can be found in [22]. 
Whatever the objectives are Pi (i = 1,2,..., N), we will always assume 
here that J2 = ($=i Lri f D and will consider only those (x,, , t,) E Q, so 
every player will be actively involved in the game. 
It is usual to classify the objectives Pi as either qualitative or quantitative 
[3]. In the next two sections we will consider each separately, though in general 
it is not necessary for all of the players in a given game to have the same kind 
of objective. Furthermore, since our model is primarily concerned with the 
dynamics of games, much of what has already been said in the literature about 
the objectives of players will be applicable here. Consequently we will 
concentrate on those aspects peculiar to our particular formulation of game 
dynamics. 
13. QUALITATIVE OBJECTIVES 
By qualitative objectives we mean such things as reaching a given target 
set, ultimate boundedness within a certain region and stability of some set, e.g., 
[2, 19,22,23]. 
Our formulation of game dynamics is well suited to this kind of objective 
and allows each player to first investigate the game as a control rather than 
conflict problem. Without doubt any player would much prefer to achieve 
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his desired objective PA without having to take into account the decisions made 
by the other players, particularly when he is not fully aware of their objectives. 
He can do this by searching his set Di for an admissible dynamical system Fsi 
which fulfils his objective Pi for play starting within the set Qi of initial events. 
The extensively developed Lyapunov theory of general semi-dynamical 
systems is available to aid in this search, though in practice, finding suitable 
Lyapunov functions will be a matter of experience and luck. 
If successful in this search, Player i can then implement such a system, 
more or less without regard to what the other players will do. Skowronski [22] 
calls this situation i-pZu&&$y and Roxin [19] calls it i-controZZabiZity. 
A detailed example of this and the use of Lyapunov theory can be found in 
Stonier [23] in which is considered a two-person game with one player trying 
to strongly equi-ultimately bound his admissible dynamical system in a 
certain compact subset of the state space and the other player trying to 
prevent this. 
In general, however, we do not expect a player to be successful in such a 
search as it is a rather stringent situation and, in effect, means there is no 
conflict for him. Of far greater game-theoretic interest is the situation in which 
no player is successful and there is actual conflict between their desired 
objectives. Then we expect, in analogy with the compromise solutions of 
quantitative games (e.g., saddles, Nash equilibria), that with “rational” play 
each player should be able to secure no worse than some weaker property Pi*. 
This will of course require some sort of preference ordering on possible 
properties Pi for each player i. At the time of writing, about all we can say is 
that the procedures used to find the compromise properties Pi* will depend 
very much on the particular preference orderings and game dynamics 
(i = 1,2,..., N). We can, however, illustrate it with the two-person game with 
no information introduced in Example 9.1. 
EXAMPLE 13.1. Let X = R and Qi = Sz, = X x R+. Furthermore, 
let ID, and 3, be the sets of admissible general semi-dynamical systems found 
in Example 9.1. We refer to [S] and [15] for definitions of the stabilities used 
below. 
For the objective PI of Player 1 we take the positive asymptotic strong 
stability of the set A, = (0) C X and as the objective Pz of Player 2 the 
positive asymptotic strong stability of the set A, = {x E X; 1 x 1 > lo}. 
It can be easily seen by inspection that there is no F, E B1 for which PI 
is satisfied, but Player 1 need achieve no worse than the positive strong stability 
(PI*) of A, by playing F,, E I, where u*(t) = 1 a.e. Similarly, there is no 
F, E 3, for which P2 is satisfied, but Player 2 need do no worse than the 
positive strong stability (P2*) of A, by playing F,, ~3, where v(t) = 1 a.e. 
Neither player here can guarantee in advance doing better than his Pi* as 
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*time t 
FIGURE 3 
that will depend on what the other player does, but neither player need do any 
worse. This can be seen from Fig. 3 where we show graphically the attainability 
sets F&x0 , t, , ti), FV,(x, , to , ti) and FU*&~,, , to , ti) = {x,,} for any x0 > 0 
and t, > t, = 0. 
14. QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES 
Games with quantitative objectives involve the players in maximizing or 
minimizing payoff functionais either at a given instant of time (games of fixed 
duration) or at the first instant of time that the corresponding F,,,,. . ,$x0, to, t) 
is completely absorbed by a target set 0 C X (games with terminatmg target 
sets). 
Since we have really only presented a new formulation of game dynamics 
here, the usual quantitative game-theoretic concepts such as value, saddles, 
and Nash equilibria will be applicable here in the appropriate circumstances 
(though Isaacs equation for value will not be in its present form as it is 
structurally dependent on a differential formulation of game dynamics). The 
possible multivaluedness of the general semi-dynamical systems F,1,8...9N in 
a 12...N , however, leads to hitherto unconsidered aspects of dynamical games. 
In Sections 15-18 we will look at a two-person quantitative game of fixed 
duration which superficially appears to be zero sum, but is in fact nonzero sum 
if anyFs1s2...sN in B,,...N is multivalued. More serious, though, is the situation 
in which some F, 6 ...sN(xo , ,, , t t) is multivalued and only ever partially 
absorbed by 0. Thii iives rise to some conceptual and practical complications, 
the resolution of which will depend on the interpretation given to the multi- 
valuedness ofFslS*...SN . See, for example, [2]. 
jOj/ZI/I-I j 
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For any (x,, , t,,) E Q and FSISa...SN in %,a..., , a game with a terminating 
target set 0 is in effect over at the first instant of time 
for which FSISZ...SN(~a , i, , ti) C 0. A s is usually done in differential games we 
could simply disregard what happens after time t, even though FSIS2...SN may 
not remain in 0. Alternatively, we could follow Roxin [19] and modify all of 
theF,jEQ (i = 1, 2 ,..., N) so that the set 0 is positively strongly invariant 
with respect to each of them. Roxin did this in order to be able to use his 
Lyapunov theorems onJinite strong stability to see whether or not the set 0 is 
ever reached. In the following example we show that this procedure may cause 
the properties of closedness and upper semicontinuity in initial conditions of 
the GSDS to be violated. This greatly reduces its appeal, although we can 
nevertheless still use the certain duality of stability and controllability if 
instead we use Storey’s concept of j&al stability [24] which does not require 
the positive strong invariance of the set 0. 
EXAMPLE 14.1. Let X = R2, 0 = {(x, y) E R2; x = 10 and 0 < y < 101 
and consider the two-person game with no information governed by 
(4 j) = (% 4 (14.1) 
where 0 < u < 1 and 0 < z, < 2. The admissible strategies U = u(*) and 
% = TJ( *) are similar to those in Example 9.1. 
Then if Player l(u) uses u(t) = 1 a.e., his resultant admissible GSDS F, is 
Fu(@o t yo), to > t> = It - to + xo> x [--2(t - to) + yo ,W - to) + yo] 
for all (x0, yo) E R and t > to >, 0. We can modify this to make 0 positively 
strongly invariant by altering (14.1) to hold only on R2\0 and setting 3i = j = 0 
on 0. Then for, say, x0 = y. = 8 and to = 0, the modified attainability sets are 
{t + S} x [-2t + 8,2t + 81 for O<t<2, 
((10) x [4, 101) u ({t + 8) x (-2t + 492 + 81) for 2 < t. 
These sets are not closed for t > 2. Moreover, by examining the modified 
attainability sets for initial conditions (x0, to) on either side of 0, we can 
easily see that upper semicontinuity in initial conditions is also violated. 
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15. A TWO-PERSON QUANTITATIVE GAME 
We will now consider in some detail a two-person quantitative game of 
fixed duration for which the (unspecified) sets Q (i = 1, 2) of admissible 
dynamical systems are assumed to satisfy Axioms I-III of our game model. 
Axiom IV is omitted as it will not be required in the sequel. 
Let T > 0 be a fixed instant of time and let A be a nonempty closed subset 
of X. Then the objective Pr of Player 1 is to minimize the distance at time T 
from the set A, and the objective Pz of Player 2 is to maximize this distance, 
in both cases for any initial condition (x0 , to) E 0, = & = X x [0, T). 
As described so far this game seems to be zero sum, and has in fact been 
investigated as such on the differential level. In particular, we draw attention 
to the work of Krasovskii and associates [IO-12, 261) who have defined saddle 
points for this game and given a sufficiency condition for their existence. 
This condition is, however, very much dependent on the analytical form of the 
game differential equation and does not seem easy to verify in practice. 
Furthermore, we believe it contributes little to an understanding of what is 
actually happening in the game. 
In the next two sections we will consider these saddle points of Krasovskii 
and derive a condition in terms of our formulation of game dynamics which is 
necessary and sufficient for their existence. We believe that the conceptual 
simplicity and ease with which this condition can be tested gives much 
insight into the acutal game conflict, and thus illustrates the potential of our 
model. 
Like Krasovskii we allow the general semi-dynamical systems F,,,?, in ID,, 
to be multivalued, but unlike him, we show that this means the game is really 
nonzero sum. Consequently we find his use of the term saddlepoint potentially 
misleading, and in the last section we briefly consider Nash equilibria and von 
Stackelberg solution concepts for this game. 
16. KRASOVKSII’S SADDLE POINTS 
Krasovskii [I I] has defined saddle points for this game as follows. 
DEFINITION 16.1. For any fixed (x0 , to) E SL a saddle point is a pair of 
admissible strategies (sr*, sa*) E 6, x 6, such that 
for all x EFsl*SZ(% , to , T), Y EF,~*,~*(% , t, , T), z ~F,~~,*(xa , t, , T) and all 
(Sl > s2) E 6, x 62 . 
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The geometric meaning of this is more transparent when expressed in the 
following equivalent form. 
PROPOSITION. Let (x,, , t,) E Q be fixed. Then (sl*, sz*) E 6, x 6, is a 
saddle point if and only if 
P*(K&~ , to , T), 4 < W1*,,&, , to , T), A), (16.1) 
P *(Fsl*sa*tXo 9to 7 Th 4 G W1,&o , o 9 t T), A), (16.2) 
both hold simultaneously for all (sl , s2) E GI x 6, . 
Proof. By (2.3) and (2.4) the following inequalities 
are true for all x EF,~*~,(x~  to , T), Y EF,~*,,+~ , to , T), z ~~~~~~~~~~~ to , T), 
and all (sl , ss) E Gr x 6, . 
Hence, (16.1) implies that p(x, A) < p(y, A) and (16.2) that p(y, A) < 
p(z, A) for all such x, y, and z. Consequently, such an (sl*, ss*) is a saddle 
point. 
The necessity part of the proof follows immediately from the fact that the 
attainability sets are all compact, and consequently, the infima and suprema 
over them of the distance functions in (16.1) and (16.2) are actually 
attained. 1 
The next proposition shows that if (s r*, sa*) is a saddle point for some 
initial condition (x0 , to E 0 then all of the points in the set FS1*SZ*(~O , to , T) 
are equidistant from A. Krasovskii calls this distance V(X, , to) the a&e of 
the game at (x0 , to). 
PROPOSITION 16.2. Let (s 1*, sz*) E 6, x GS be a saddle point of the game 
for some jxed (x0 , to) E Q. Then there exists a constant V(x, , to) such that 
I/‘@, > to) = S&&o , to , T), -4 = ~*(Fs~&o, to , T), A). 
Proof. As (16.1) holds for all ss E 6, , it holds in particular for sg* E Ga , 
and so, 
~*(F,v(xo , to , T), 4 d S(~,w(xo , to t T), 4. 
This combined with (16.3) gives the desired result. 1 
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17. EXTREMAL STRATEGIES AND SADDLE POINTS 
We now define extremal strategies for each player in this game. They are not 
unlike Krasovskii’s extremal aiming strategies, though are defined quite 
differently. After establishing some of their basic properties we will use them 
to derive a test for the existence of saddle points of the game. 
DEFINITION 17.1. (See 26). Let (x0 , ,, t ) E !J be any fixed initial condition. 
Then an admissible strategy 
6) sr* E 6, is called extremal for Player I if 
To+0 3to) = P*(F&~ ,to , T), 4 = inf(p*(F,,(x, , to ,T), A); s1 E 6,); 
(ii) s2* E 6, is called extremal for Player 2 if 
GPO > to> = W2*(xo 7 to 7 9, 4 = SUP{~(~&o, 4l , T), A); s2 E 52). 
THEOREM 17.1. Extremal strategies exist for both Players 1 and 2 for any 
initial condition (x,, , to) E Q. 
Proof. By Axiom I the set ai of admissible general semi-dynamical 
systems is a compact subset of g(X) and consequently the set {F,i(x, , to , T); 
si E Gi} is a compact subset of the space of nonempty closed subsets of X 
topologized with the Hausdorff metric (i = I, 2). From this compactness and 
the properties of the two distance functions p* and 6, it follows that the 
infimum and supremum in Definition 17.1 are actually attained. 1 
By Corollary 10.1 and the compactness of the sets bi (i = 1,2) and of the 
attainability sets of GSDS, it is easily seen that 
P *(F&o 3 to, T), 4 = max{p*(Fsl,a(xo , to , T), 4; s2 6 G2>, (17.1) 
and 
W,,(xo , to , T), 4 = minWs,,,(xo, to , T), A); s1 6 G,) (17.2) 
for any (x0 , to) E D and any (sr , sJ E G, x 6, . From this we can derive the 
following properties of extremal strategies. 
THEOREM 17.2. For any Jixed initial condition (x0 , to) E Q a strategy 
(9 sl* E 6, is extremal for Player 1 if and only if it is minimax; 
(ii) sp* E 6, is extremal for Player 2 if and only if it is maximin. 
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Proof. For (17.1) and (17.2) we have, for all (sl, sa) E 6, x Ga , 
rob0 , to) = m~{p*(~,,~,,(xo , to , T), A); s2 E G2> 
= max{p*(F,l,z(xo , to , T), A); s2 E G,>, 
and 
ro(xo , to) = mW(~,l,24~o , to, T), 4; s1 E G> 
= min{~(~,,,,(xo , to , T), 4; s1 E $1. 
These are respectively the definitions of the minimax strategy for Player 1 
and the maximin strategy for Player 2. m 
THEOREM 17.3. r,(x, , to) < p”(xo , to) for all (x0, to) E L? 
Proof. By Theorem 17.1, both r,(x, , to) and r”(xo , to) exist for any 
(x0 , to) in Q. Now let (x, , to) E Q be fixed and let (si*, s2*) E 6, x G2 be the 
corresponding extremal strategies. Then 
by the definitions of the distance functions and attainability sets used. 1 
In terms of our formulation of game dynamics, it is very easy to determine 
the extremal strategies of the numerical values of r,(x, , to) and rO(xo, to) 
for any initial condition (x0 , to) E Q. For this no assumptions are needed on 
the kind of information available to the players, other than knowledge of the 
initial condition. In fact, each player can determine his own extremal strategy 
and corresponding quantity To or To without even knowing what the objective 
of the other player is, in which circumstances an extremal strategy corre- 
sponds to his making the best out of the potentially worst situation. 
Our next theorem gives a very simple test for the existence or not of saddle 
points for this game. 
THEOREM 17.4. Let (x0, o t ) E Q be fixed. Then a necessary and sujicient 
condition for a pair of strategies (sl*, s *) E Gl x $ to be a saddle point is that 2 
(9 h*, sz*) are extremal strategies; 
(ii) ro(xo , to) = r”(xo , to). 
In this case, we write V(xo , to) = r,(x, , to) = r”(xo, to). 
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Proof. Let (sl*, a s *) E 6, x 6, be a saddle point for (A+, to) E Sz. Then by 
Propositions 16.1 and 16.2, we have for all (sl , ss) E Gr x Gs 
qxo , to) = Wpsz*(xo , to 7 T)> 4 t P *(&l*s2(XO > to , T), 4, 
and 
From this and 17. I, we then have for all sr E 6, , 
P*(Kl*(xo 9 to 1 n 4 = P*P.~ps2*(xo >to , T), 4 
G qK1s2*(xo 9 0 3 t T),A) 
d P*(Kls2*(xo > to 9 n A) 
6 f*p&o 3 to > q A), 
so sl* is an extremal strategy for Player 1 and V(X, , to) = I’a(x, , to). 
Similarly, using 17.2 now, we have for all sa E &, 
W2*(xo 9 to 9 T)> 4 = wsl*s2*(~o , to , n 4 
3 P*(cl*&o ! to ? T), 4 
3 ~(~sl*sz(xO , to , q, A) 
2 ~(c&o , to , q A), 
so sa* is an extremal strategy for Player 2 and V(X, , to) = ro(xo, to). 
To prove sufficiency, let (s r*, sr*) E 6, x Gs be extremal strategies and 
let r”(xo , to) = r”(xo , to). Then by Definition 17.1 and the definitions of the 
distances p* and 6, we have for all (sr , sa) E 6, x 6, , 
r”(%J , to) = p*(F3,*(xo 7 t > q A) 3 P*(~sl*a2(x0 9 to , T), A). 
Thus, by the hypothesis that ro(xo , to) = r”(xo , to), we have for all 
(5 ,4 E 6, x G? 
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and 
and so, by Proposition 16.1, (sr*, sa*) is a saddle point. B 
Krasovskii’s sufficiency condition for this game is an analytical condition 
based on the game differential equation which in effect ensures that 
qql I to) = P(x 0 , to). He calls such games regular. His work is, however, 
restricted to games with perfect information, and his test for regularity is by 
no means easy to carry out. 
We conclude this section with a simple example of a game with such a 
saddle point. 
EXAMPLE 17. Let X = R, A = (0) C X, and let the sets IDi (; = 1,2) of 
admissible dynamics be as in Example 9.1. Then for any (x0 , to) E Q, the 
extremal strategy for Player 1 is u*(t) z 1 a.e. with r”(xo, to) = 1 x0 /, and 
for Player 2, v*(t) = 1 with r,(x, , to) = / x0 j, too. Thus, (u*, v*) is a saddle 
point in the sense of Krasovskii. (In fact it is a saddle point in the true sense as 
each F,, in a,, is single-valued in this example.) 
18. NASH EQUILIBRIA 
Our statement in Section 15 of the objectives Pi (; = 1, 2) of the players 
in this game is somewhat ambiguous if the attainability set Fslsz(xO , to , 2') is 
multivalued for some FglYB in IDrs: From which points in this set do the players 
measure the distances they wish to minimize or maximize ? 
In what follows we will hold the initial condition (x0 , to) E Q fixed. Then 
from the conservative nature of the saddle point concept, it seems that Player 1 
should minimize the distance 
of the furtherest point in F,l,B(xo , to , 2’) from the set A, and Player 2 should 
try to maximize the distance 
J&I , 4 = W&o > to 3 T), A) 
of the closest point in this set A. We will take these to be the objectives PI 
and Pz of Players 1 and 2, respectively. 
Now it is always true for all strategies (sr , sz) E G, x 6, that 
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from 2.3 and 2.4. However, equality need not hold here unless we impose 
further restrictions on the attainability sets F,Jx,-, , to , 7’). Consequently, 
this game will m general be nonzero sum and strrctly speaking a solution 
concept such as Nash equilibria should be used instead of saddle points. 
DEFINITION 18.1. (E.g., see [21].) An admissible strategy pair 
(sl*, sz*> E 61 x 6, 
is called a Nash equilibrium point if for all (sr , sZ) E 6, x 6, both of the 
following hold: 
(9 Ml*, +.*I G Ml , h*); 
(ii) /45*, 4 < Jz(sl*, h*). 
Consequently, Krasovskii’s saddle points are thus really just Nash equilibria 
for which 
r,(xo > to) = Jh”, sz*> = .&*, sz*> = To@0 9 to). 
They, however, need not be saddle points in the true sense unless we impose 
further assumptions on the attainability sets F,l,a(~o , to , T), as in Example 
17.1. For this reason, we feel that Krasovskii’s terminology is potentially 
misleading. 
Our Theorem 17.4 is thus a sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium point for this game. We now ask if Nash equilibria need always 
exist when ro(xo , to) < r”(xo , to) ? To this we conjecture a negative answer 
with our reasoning based on the following example. 
“2 .............. .............. .............. 
n 
............. 
“3 ;-:e<-y.;;:g-j; ............. ............. ............ T 




228 PETER E. KLOEDEN 
EXAMPLE 18.1. Let X = R2 and A = R x (0). Then consider sets of 
admissible dynamical systems 3, = {FYI , F,,} and a, = {Fwl , FV, , FVt} with 
attainability sets at time T for some initral condition (x,, , to) E Q as illustrated 
in Fig. 4. 
The extremal strategies are u1 and u2 , and r,(x, , to) < r”(xo , to). It is, 
however, easy to see that no pair of strategies (ui , v~) is a Nash equilibrium 
point, in particular the extremal pair (ur , v2). 
For this situation the zlolz Stackelberg solution concept comes to mind. See 
[21] for details. It is easily seen that with Player 1 as the leader, the extremal 
pair (ul , v2) is the von Stackelberg strategy pair. With Player 2 as the leader, 
the von Stackelberg strategy pair is (~a , v2) and both players receive a better 
payoff in this case. Player 1 is, however, not playing his extremal strategy here, 
so there needs to be some enforcement rule in the game to prevent Player 2 
from taking advantage of this. 
APPENDIX 
The fundamental objects in our model of game dynamics are the sets 
QCs(X) f d o a missible general semi-dynamical systems. The indices si E Gi 
of the Fs, E IDi are then called the strategies of the ith player. 
Now every motion of such an Fsi E IDi can also be considered indexed, 
albeit implicitly, with si . Then what our operation of motion-intersection 
does in reclaiming the actual game dynamics 
for a given strategy N-tuple (sl , s2 ,..., sN) 5 6, X 6, X ... X 6, , is in 
effect to separate out all those motions common to these N general semi- 
dynamical systems Fsd and to index them implicitly with the N-tuple 
(Sl , s2 ,***, sN). When nothing else is known about the dynamics of a game this 
procedure seems most reasonable, if indeed the only means available of 
reclaiming the actual game dynamics. 
The referee has drawn our attention to a serious conceptual difficulty 
which may arise if there are natural sets of strategies underlying the sets of 
admissible general semi-dynamical systems, as in differential games. For 
example consider the two-person differential game with no information 
2 = uw (A.11 
where u and YJ are constrained to [0, 11. Then for u*(t) = v*(t) = 1 a.e., we 
have for each x0 > 0 and t >, to 3 0, 
F&o , to , t) = F&o , 6, , t) = [x,, , xc, f t - f,]. 
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These two general semi-dynamical systems have the motion-intersection 
Fu* A F&q, , to , 2) = [xo , x,, + t - toI, 
which is considerably larger than the unique trajectory 
F,*&o , to , t) = +o + t - to) 
obtained by inserting the open-loop startegy pair (u*, v*) into (A.l). All the 
other motions of F,, A F,, are generated by pairs of open-loop strategies 
(u*, w) and (u, v*) where u # u* and v # w*. The operation of motion- 
intersection is unable to distinguish these motions from those generated by 
(u*, v*). 
For such games we should thus keep track of which strategy IV-tuple 
(s1 , -% ,... , sN) a given motion is due; in effect, we should retain the actual 
F S1S2”‘SN~ 
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